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ABSTRACT
In order to address privacy concerns, many social media
websites allow users to hide their personal profiles from the
public. In this work, we show how an adversary can exploit
an online social network with a mixture of public and private
user profiles to predict the private attributes of users. We
map this problem to a relational classification problem and
we propose practical models that use friendship and group
membership information (which is often not hidden) to infer
sensitive attributes. The key novel idea is that in addition
to friendship links, groups can be carriers of significant in-
formation. We show that on several well-known social media
sites, we can easily and accurately recover the information
of private-profile users. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first work that uses link-based and group-based classifi-
cation to study privacy implications in social networks with
mixed public and private user profiles.
1. INTRODUCTION
In order to address users’ privacy concerns, a number of
social media and social network websites, such as Facebook,
Orkut and Flickr, allow their participants to set the privacy
level of their online profiles and to disclose either some or
none of the attributes in their profiles. While some users
make use of these features, not surprisingly, others are more
open to sharing personal information and they disclose more
information in their profiles. For example, some people feel
comfortable displaying personal attributes such as age, po-
litical affiliation or location, while others do not. In addi-
tion, most social-media users utilize the social networking
services provided by forming friendship links and affiliating
with groups of interest. While a person’s profile may remain
private, the friendship links and group affiliations are often
visible to the public. Unfortunately, these friendships and
affiliations leak information; in fact, as we will show, they
can leak a surpisingly large amount of information.
The problem we consider is sensitive attribute inference
in social networks: inferring the private information of users
given a social network in which some profiles are public and
all links and group memberships are exposed (this is a com-
monly occurring scenario in existing social media sites). We
define the problem more formally in Section 4. To the best
of our knowledge, our work is the first one to look at this
problem, and to map it to a relational classification problem
in network data with groups.
An earlier version of this paper appears as technical report CS-TR-4922,
July 2008.
Here, we propose seven privacy attacks for sensitive at-
tribute inference. The attacks use different classifiers and
features, and show different ways in which an adversary can
utilize links and groups in predicting private information.
We evaluate our proposed models using sample datasets
from four well-known social media websites: Flickr, Face-
book, Dogster and BibSonomy. All of these websites allow
their users to form friendships and participate in groups, and
our results show that an attack using the group information
achieves significantly better accuracy than the models that
ignore it. This suggests that group memberships in social
networks have a strong potential for leaking information,
and if links and group affiliations are public, users’ privacy
in social networks is illusionary at best.
Our contributions include the following:
• We identify a number of novel privacy attacks in social
networks with a mixture of public and private profiles.
• We propose that in addition to friendship links, group
affiliations can be carriers of significant information.
• We show how to reduce the large number of potential
groups in order to improve the accuracy of group-based
attribute inference.
• We illustrate the privacy implications of publicly affiliat-
ing with groups in social networks and discuss how our
study affects anonymization of social networks.
• We evaluate our attacks on challenging classification tasks
in four social media datasets.
• We show how surprisingly easy it is to infer private in-
formation from group membership data.
We motivate the problem in the next section. Then, we
describe the data model in Section 3. Section 4 presents
the privacy attacks for sensitive attribute inference, and
Section 5 provides experimental results using these attacks.
Section 6 presents related work, and Section 7 discusses the
broader implications of our results.
2. MOTIVATION
Disclosing private information means violating the rights
of people to control who can access their private information.
Therefore, in order to prevent private information leakage,
it is very important to be aware of the ways in which an
adversary can attack a social network to learn the private
attributes of users. Studies on the challenges of preserving
the privacy of individuals in social networks have emerged
only in the last few years, and they have concentrated on
inferring the identity of nodes based on structural proper-
Figure 1: Toy instance of the data model.
ties such as node degree. In contrast, we are interested in
inferring sensitive attribute of nodes using some of the ap-
proaches developed for relational learning, another active
area of research in the last few years.
The novelty of our work is that we study the implications
of mixing private and public profiles in a social network. We
show that it is very important to be able to make private
not only profiles but also friendship links and group mem-
berships. For example, in Facebook many users choose to
set their profiles to private, so that noone but their friends
can see their profile details. Yet, fewer people hide their
friendship links and even if they do, their friendship links
can be found through the backlinks from their public-profile
friends. Similarly for group participation information – even
if a user makes her profile private, her participation in a
public group is shown on the group’s membership list. Cur-
rently, neither Facebook nor Flickr allow users to hide their
group memberships from public groups. It is important that
social media website providers protect their users against
undesired eavesdropping by informing them of the possible
privacy breaches and providing them with the means to be in
full control of their private data. Besides undesired eaves-
dropping by curious people, attacks on private attributes
can be used for various purposes by commercial and govern-
mental entities that the user may wish to protect against,
including targeted advertising, health care screening, polit-
ical monitoring, etc.
Our work is also complimentary to work on data anonymiza-
tion. In data anonymization the goal is to perturb data in
such a way that the privacy of individuals is preserved. Even
though the goal of our work is not to release anonymized
data, it illustrates how data in social networks can be ex-
ploited to predict hidden information; this is important in
guiding the anonymization process.
We identify a new type of privacy breach in relational
data, group membership disclosure: whether a person affili-
ates with a group relevant to the classification of a sensitive
attribute. We conjecture that hiding group memberships is
important in preserving the privacy of individuals and their
personal data because group membership disclosure can lead
to an attribute disclosure.
3. DATA MODEL
We represent a social network as a graph G = (V, E, H),
where V is a set of n nodes of the same type, E is a set of
edges (the friendship links), and H is a set of groups that
nodes can belong to. ei,j ∈ E represents a directed link from
node vi to node vj . Our model handles undirected links by
representing them as pairs of directed links. We describe
a group as a hyper-edge h ∈ H among all the nodes who
belong to that group; h.U denotes the set of users who are
connected through hyper-edge h and v.H denotes the groups
that node v belongs to. Similarly, v.F is the set of nodes
that v has connected to: vi.F = {vj |∃ei,j ∈ E}. A group
can also have a set of properties h.T .
We assume that each node v has a sensitive attribute v.a
which is either observed or hidden in the data. A sensitive
attribute is a personal attribute, such as age, political affil-
iation or location, which some users in the social network
are willing to disclose publicly while others keep private. A
sensitive attribute value can take on one of a set of pos-
sible values {a1...am}. A user profile has a unique id with
which the user forms online relationships and participates in
groups. Each profile is associated with a sensitive attribute,
either observed or hidden. A private profile is one for which
the sensitive attribute value is unknown, and a public profile
is the opposite: a profile with an observed sensitive attribute
value. We refer to the set of nodes with private profiles as
the sensitive set of nodes Vs, and to the rest as the observed
set Vo. The adversary’s goal is to predict Vs.A, the sensitive
attributes of the private profiles.
Here, we study the case where nodes have no other at-
tribute information beyond the sensitive attribute. This
means that in order to make inferences about the sensitive
attribute, we need to use some form of relational classifier.
While additional attribute information can be helpful and
many relational classifiers can make use of it, in our setting
this is not possible because all of the attributes are likely to
be hidden in private profiles.
As a running example, we consider the social network pre-
sented in Figure 1. It describes a collection of individuals
(Ana, Bob, Chris, Don, Emma, Fabio, and Gia), along with
their friendship links and information about the interest
groups in which they participate. Chris, Don, Emma and
Fabio are displaying their attribute values publicly, while
Ana, Bob and Gia are keeping theirs private. Emma and
Chris have the same sensitive attribute value (marked solid),
Bob, Gia and Fabio share the same attribute value (marked
with stripes), and Ana and Don have a third value (marked
with a brick pattern). Users are linked by a friendship link,
and in this example they are reciprocal. There are two
groups that users can participate in: the ”Espresso lovers”
group and the ”Yucatan” group. While affiliating with some
groups may be related to the sensitive attribute, affiliating
with others is not. For example, if the sensitive attribute is
a person’s country of origin, the ”Yucatan” group may be
relevant. Thus, this group information can leak information
about sensitive attributes, although the manner in which it
is leaked is not necessarily straightforward.
4. SENSITIVE-ATTRIBUTE INFERENCE
MODELS
The attributes of users who are connected in social net-
works are often correlated. At the same time, online com-
munities allow very diverse people to connect to each other
and form relationships that transcend gender, religion, ori-
gin and other boundaries. As this happens, it becomes
harder to utilize the complex interactions in online social
networks for predicting user attributes.
Attribute disclosure occurs when an adversary is able to
infer the sensitive attribute of a real-world entity accurately.
The sensitive attribute value of an individual can be mod-
eled as a random variable. This random variable’s distribu-
tion can depend on the overall network’s attribute distribu-
tion, the friendship network’s attribute distribution or the
attribute distribution of each group the user joins.
The problem of sensitive attribute inference is to infer the
hidden sensitive values, Vs.A, conditioned on the observed
sensitive attribute values, links and group membership in
graph G. We assume that the adversary can apply a proba-
bilistic model M for predicting the hidden sensitive attribute
values, and he can combine the given graph information in




PM (vs.a = ai; G).
where PM (vs.a = ai; G) is the probability that the sensitive
attribute value of node vs ∈ Vs is ai according to model M
and the observed part of graph G.
We assume that the overall distribution of the sensitive
attribute is either known or it can be found using the pub-
lic profiles. An attack using this distribution is a baseline
attack. A successful attack is one which, given extra knowl-
edge, e.g., friendship links or group affiliations, has a signif-
icantly higher accuracy than the baseline attack. The extra
knowledge compromises the privacy of users if there is an
attack which uses it and is successful.
4.1 Attacks without links and groups
In the absence of relationship and group information, the
only available information is the overall marginal distribu-
tion for the sensitive attribute in the public profiles. So,
the simplest model is to use this as the basis for predicting
the sensitive attributes of the private profiles. More pre-
cisely, according to this model, BASIC, the probability of
a sensitive attribute value can be estimated as the fraction
of observed users who have that sensitive attribute value:




where |Vo.ai| is the number of public profiles with sensitive
attribute value ai and |Vo| is the total number of public
profiles. The adversary using model BASIC picks the most
probable attribute value which in this case is the overall
mode of the multinomial attribute distribution. In our toy
example, the most common observed sensitive attribute is
the value that Chris and Emma share. Therefore, the ad-
versary would predict that Ana, Bob and Gia have the same
attribute value as well. An obvious problem with this ap-
proach is that if there is a sensitive attribute value that is
predominant in the observed data, it will be predicted for
all users with private profiles. Nevertheless, this attack is
always at least as good as a random guess, and we use it as
a simple baseline. Next, we look at using friendship infor-
mation for inferring the attribute value.
4.2 Privacy attacks using links
Link-based privacy attacks take advantage of autocorrela−
tion, the property that the attribute values of linked objects
Figure 2: Graphical representation of the models.
Grayed areas correspond to variables that are ig-
nored in the model.
are correlated. An example of autocorrelation is that peo-
ple who are friends often share common characteristics (as
in the proverb ”Tell me who your friends are, and I’ll tell you
who you are”). Figure 2(a) shows a graphical representation
of the link-based classification model. There is a random
variable associated with each sensitive attribute v.a, and
the sensitive attributes of linked nodes are correlated. The
greying of the other two types of random variables means
that the group information is not used in this model.
4.2.1 Friend-aggregate model (AGG)
The nodes and their links produce a graph structure in
which one can identify circles of close friends. For exam-
ple, the circle of Bob’s friends is the set of users that he has
links to: Bob.F = {Ana, Chris, Emma, Fabio}. The friend-
aggregate model AGG looks at the sensitive attribute dis-
tribution amongst the friends of the person under question.
According to this model, the probability of the sensitive at-
tribute value can be estimated by:
PAGG(vs.a = ai; G) = P (vs.a = ai|Vo.A, E) =
|V ′o .ai|
|V ′o |
where V ′o = {vo ∈ Vo|∃(vs, vo) ∈ E} and V ′o .ai = {vo ∈
V ′o |vo.a = ai}.
Again, the adversary using this model picks the most
probable attribute value (i.e., the mode of the friends’ at-
tribute distribution). In our toy example (Figure 1), Bob
would pick the same value as Emma and Chris, Ana the
same label as Don, and Gia will be undecided between Don’s,
Emma’s and Fabio’s label. One problem with this method
is the one when person’s friends are very diverse, as in Gia’s
case, it will be difficult to make a prediction.
4.2.2 Collective classification model (CC)
Collective classification also takes advantage of autocorre-
lation between linked objects. Unlike more traditional meth-
ods, in which each instance is classified independently of the
rest, collective classification aims at learning and inferring
class labels of linked objects together. In our setting, it
makes use of not only the public profiles but also the inferred
values for connected private profiles. Collective classification
has been an active area of research in the last decade (see
Sen et al. [20] for a survey). Some of the approximate in-
ference algorithms proposed include iterative classification
(ICA), Gibbs sampling, loopy belief propagation and mean-
field relaxation labeling.
For our experiments, we have chosen to use ICA because
it is simple, fast and has been shown to perform well on a
number of problems [20]. In our setting, ICA first assigns
a label to each private profile based on the labels of the
friends with public profiles, then it iteratively re-assigns la-
bels considering the labels of both public and private-profile
friends. The assignment is based on a local classifier which
takes the friends’ class labels as features. For example, a
simple classifier could assign a label based on the majority
of the friends labels. A more sophisticated classifier can be
trained using the counts of friends’ labels.
4.2.3 Flat-link model (LINK)
Another approach to dealing with links is to ”flatten” the
data by considering the adjacency matrix of the graph. In
this model, each row in the matrix is a user instance. In
other words, each user has a list of binary features of the size
of the network, and each feature has a value of 1 if the user is
friends with the person who corresponds to this feature, and
0 otherwise. The user instance also has a class label which
is known if the user’s profile is public, and unknown if it is
private. The instances with public profiles are the training
data which can be fed to any traditional classifier, such as
Näıve Bayes, logistic regression or SVM. The learned model
can then be applied to predict the private profile labels.
4.2.4 Blockmodeling attack (BLOCK)
The next category of link-based methods we explored are
approaches based on blockmodeling [23, 2]. The basic idea
behind stochastic blockmodeling is that users form natural
clusters or blocks, and their interactions can be explained
by the blocks they belong to. In particular, the link prob-
ability between two users is the same as the link proba-
bility between their corresponding blocks. If sensitive at-
tribute values separate users in blocks, then based on the
observed interactions of a private-profile user with public-
profile users, one can predict the most likely block that the
user belongs to and thus discover the attribute value. Let
block Bi denote the set of public profiles that have attribute
value ai, and λi,j the probability that a link exists between
users in block Bi and users in block Bj . Thus, λi is the vec-
tor of all link probabilities between block Bi and each block
B1, ..., Bm. Similarly, let the probability of a link between
a single user v and a block Bj be λ(v)j with λ(v) being
the vector of link probabilities between v and each block.
To find the probability that a private-profile user belongs to
a particular block, the model looks at the maximum simi-
larity between the interaction patterns (link probability to
each block) of the node in question and the overall interac-
tions between blocks. After finding the most likely block,
the sensitive attribute value is predicted. The probability of
an attribute value using the blockmodeling attack BLOCK
is estimated by:




where sim() can be any vector similarity function and Z is
a normalization factor. We compute maximum similarity
using the minimum L2 norm. This model is similar to the
class-distribution relational-neighbour classifier described in
[16] when the weight of each directed edge is inversely pro-
portional to the size of the class of the receiving node.
4.3 Privacy attacks using groups
In addition to link or friendship information, social net-
works offer a very rich structure through the group member-
ships of users. All individuals in a group are bound together
by some observed or hidden interest(s) that they share, and
individuals often belong to more than one group. Thus,
groups offer a broad perspective on a person, and it may be
possible to use them for sensitive attribute inference. If a
user belongs to only one group (as it is Gia’s case in the toy
example), then it is straightforward to infer a label using an
aggregate, e.g., the mode, of her groupmates’ labels, similar
to the friend-aggregate model. This problem becomes more
complex when there are multiple groups that a user belongs
to, and their distributions suggest different values for the
sensitive attribute. We propose two models for utilizing the
groups in predicting the sensitive attribute – a model which
assumes that all groupmates are friends and one which takes
groups as classifier features.
4.3.1 Groupmate-link model (CLIQUE)
One can think of groupmates as friends to whom users are
implicitly linked. In this model, we assume that each group
is a clique of friends, thus creating a friendship link between
users who belong to at least one group together. This data
representation allows us to apply any of the link-based mod-
els that we have already described. The advantage of this
model is that it simplifies the problem to a link-based classi-
fication problem, which has been studied more thoroughly.
One of the disadvantages is that it doesn’t account for the
strength of the relationship between two people, e.g. num-
ber of common groups.
4.3.2 Group-based classification model (GROUP)
Another approach to dealing with groups is to consider
each group as a feature in a classifier. While some groups
may be useful in inferring the sensitive attribute, a problem
in many of the datasets that we encountered was that users
were members of a very large number of groups, so identi-
fying which groups are likely to be predictive is important.
Ideally, we would like to discard group memberships irrele-
vant to the classification task. For example, the group ”Yu-
catan” may be relevant for finding where a person is from,
but ”Espresso lovers” may not be.
To select the relevant groups, one can apply standard fea-
ture selection criteria [13]. If there are N groups, the number
of candidate group subsets is 2N , and finding an optimal fea-
ture subset is intractable. Similar to pruning words in doc-
ument classification, one can prune groups based on their
properties and evaluate their predictive accuracy. Exam-
ple group properties include density, size and homogeneity.
Smaller groups may be more predictive than large groups,
and groups with high homogeneity may be more predictive
of the class value. For example, if the classification task is to
predict the country that people are from, a cultural group in
which 90% of the people are from the same country is more
likely to be predictive of the country class label. One way
to measure group homogeneity is by computing the entropy
of the group: Entropy(h) = −
Pm
i=1 p(ai) log2 p(ai) where
m is the number of possible node class values and p(ai) is




For example, the group ”Yucatan” has an entropy of 0
because only one attribute value is represented there, there-
fore its homogeneity is very high. We also consider the con-
fidence in the computed group entropy. One way to measure
this is through the percent of public profiles in the group.
The group-based classification approach contains three
main steps as Algorithm 1 shows. In the first step, the algo-
rithm performs feature selection: it selects the groups that
are relevant to the node classification task. This can either
be done automatically or by a domain expert. Ideally, when
the number of groups is high, the feature selection should
be automated. For example, the function isRelevant(h) can
return true if the entropy of group h is low. In the second
step, the algorithm learns a global function f , e.g., trains
a classifier, that takes the relevant groups of a node as fea-
tures and returns the sensitive attribute value. This step
uses only the nodes from the observed set whose sensitive
attributes are known. Each node v is represented as a bi-
nary vector where each dimension corresponds to a unique
group: {groupId : isMember}, v.a. Only memberships to
relevant groups are considered and v.a is the class coming
from a multinomial distribution which denotes the sensitive-
attribute value. In the third step, the classifier returns the
predicted sensitive attribute for each private profile. Fig-
ure 2(b) shows a graphical representation of the group-based
classification model. It shows that there is a dependence be-
tween the nodes’ sensitive attributes V.A, the group mem-
berships H and the group attributes T .
Algorithm 1 Group-based classification model
1: Set of relevant groups Hrelevant = ∅
2: for each group h ∈ H do
3: if isRelevant(h) then
4: Hrelevant = Hrelevant ∪ {h}
5: end if
6: end for
7: trainClassifier(f, Vo, Hrelevant)
8: for each sensitive node v ∈ Vs do
9: v.â = f(v.Hrelevant)
10: end for
5. EXPERIMENTS
We evaluated each of the proposed models to see how
effective they were for inferring sensitive attributes in online
social networks.
5.1 Data description
For our evaluation, we studied four diverse online commu-
nities: the photo-sharing website Flickr, the social network
Facebook, Dogster, an online social network for dogs, and
the social bookmarking system BibSonomy1. For Flickr, the
sensitive attribute is the country of the user. For Facebook,
the sensitive attributes are gender and political views. For
Dogster, the attribute is breed, and for BibSonomy, it is
whether or not a user is malicious (a spammer). Table 1
shows important properties of the datasets.
Flickr is a photo-sharing community in which users can
display their photographs, comment on other users’ pho-
tos, create directed friendship links, form and participate
in groups of common interest. Users have the choice of pro-
viding personal information on their profiles, such as gender,
marital status and location. We collected a snowball sample
of 14, 451 users from it. To resolve the location attributes
(which users enter manually, as opposed to choosing them
from a list), we used a two-step process. In the first step,
1At http://www.flickr.com, http://www.facebook.com,
http://www.dogster.com, http://www.bibsonomy.org/
we used Google Maps API2 to find and unify the latitude
and longitude of each user location. In the second step, we
mapped the latitude and longitude back to a country loca-
tion using the reverse-geocoding capabilities of GeoNames3.
We discarded the profiles with no resolved country location
(34%), and also the ones that belonged to a country with
less than 10 representatives. The resulting sample contained
9, 179 users from 55 countries. There were 47, 754 groups
with at least 2 members in the sample, and the number of
groups of a particular size followed a power-law distribution
with many small groups.
Facebook is a social network which allows users to commu-
nicate with each other, to form undirected friendship links
and participate in groups and events. A part of the Face-
book network is available for research purposes [10], and we
used it in our experiments. It contains information about
all 1, 598 profiles of first-year students in a small college.
The dataset does not contain social group information but
it contains the favorite books, music and movies of the users,
and we considered them to be the groups that unify people.
1, 225 of the users share at least one group with another
person, and 1, 576 users have friendship links. All profiles
have gender and 965 have self-declared political views. We
use six labels of political views - very liberal or liberal (545
profiles), moderate (210), conservative or very conservative
(114), libertarian (29), apathetic (18), and other (49).
Dogster is a pet social networking website where dog own-
ers can create profiles describing their dogs, and they post
and share information that includes photos and personal
characteristics, as well as membership in community groups.
Members also maintain links to dog friends and family mem-
bers. The dataset contains a random sample of 10, 000 pro-
files from Dogster. The dogs that do not participate in any
groups were removed from the sample. The remaining 2, 632
dogs participate in 1, 042 groups with at least two members
each, and they have 4, 482 links. Each dog has a breed
such as golden retriever or beagle. Each breed belongs to
a broader type set. In our dataset, there were mostly toy
dogs (749). The other major breed categories were work-
ing (268), herding (202), terrier (232), sporting (308), non-
sporting (225), hound (152) and mixed dogs (506).
The fourth dataset contains publicly available data from
the social bookmarking website BibSonomy4, in which users
can tag bookmarks and publications. Although BibSonomy
allows users to form friendships and join groups of inter-
est, the dataset did not contain this information. There-
fore, we consider each tag placed by a person to be a group
to which a user belongs. We considered tag instances for
both bookmarks and publications, and converted them all to
lower case. There are no links between users other than the
group affiliations. There are 31, 715 users with at least one
tag, 98.7% of which posted the same tag with at least one
other user. The sensitive attribute is the binary attribute of
whether someone is a spammer or not.
5.2 Experimental setup
We ran experiments for each of the presented attack mod-
els: 1) the baseline model, an attack in the absence of link
and group information (BASIC), 2) the friend-aggregate at-




Table 1: Properties of the four datasets.
Property Flickr Facebook Dogster BibSonomy
Number of users 9,179 1,598/965 2,632 31,715
Number of links 941,677 86,007/33,597 4,482 N/A
Number of groups 47,754 2,932/2,497 1,042 132,554
Average in-sample degree 142 108/70 1 N/A
Average number of groups per user 162 24/25 1 98
Average group size 31 10/9 3 9
Largest group size 4,527 290/221 118 7,182
Percent links between nodes with the same label 23.5% 49.9%/40.3% - N/A
Number of possible labels 55 2/6 7 2
Sensitive attribute location gender/polviews breed category spammer
Table 2: Attack accuracy assuming 50% private profiles. The successful attacks are shown in bold.
Attack model Flickr Facebook (gender) Facebook (polviews) Dogster BibSonomy
BASIC 27.7% 50.0% 56.5% 28.6% 92.2%
Random guess 1.8% 50.0% 16.7% 14.3% 50%
BLOCK 8.8% 49.1% 6.1% - -
AGG 28.4% 50.2% 57.6% - -
CC 28.6% 50.4% 56.3% - -
LINK 56.5% 68.6% 58.1% - -
CLIQUE-LINK 46.3% 51.8% 57.1% 60.2% -
GROUP 63.5% 73.4% 45.2% 65.5% 94.0%
GROUP (50% node coverage) 83.6% 77.2% 46.6% 82.0% 96.0%
the flat-link attack (LINK) and 5) the blockmodeling at-
tack (BLOCK), 6) the groupmate-link attack (CLIQUE)
and 7) the group-based classification attack (GROUP). For
the GROUP model, we present results on both the sim-
pler version which considers all groups and the method in
which relevant groups are selected. For the BLOCK model,
we present leave-one-out experiments assuming that com-
plete information is given in the network in order to predict
the sensitive-attribute of a user. For the AGG, CC, LINK,
CLIQUE and GROUP models, we split the data into test
and training by randomly assigning each profile to be private
with a probability n%. For LINK and GROUP, we used an
implementation of SVM for multi-value classification [22].
Groups were marked as relevant to the classification task
either based on maximum size cutoff, maximum entropy cut-
off and/or minimum percent of public profiles in the group.
For each experiment, we measure accuracy, node coverage
and group coverage. Accuracy is the correct classification
rate, node coverage is the portion of private profiles for
which we can predict the sensitive attribute, and group cov-
erage is the portion of groups used for classification. The
reported results are the averages over 5 trials for each set of
parameters. We consider an attack to be successful if its av-
erage accuracy minus its standard deviation was larger than
the baseline accuracy plus its standard deviation.
5.3 Sensitive-attribute inference results
Table 2 provides a summary of the results, assuming 50%
private profiles. We see a wide variation in the performance
of the different methods. The last line shows the accuracy
for half of the users who participate with at least one other
user in a group. We also present experiments for varying %
of private profiles (Figure 3(d) and Figure 5).
5.3.1 Flickr
Link-based attacks. Not surprisingly, in the absence of link
and group information, our baseline achieved a relatively
low accuracy (27.7%). However, surprisingly, the link-based
methods AGG and CC also performed quite badly. AGG’s
accuracy was 28.4%, predicting that most users were from
the United States. The iterative collective classification at-
tack, CC, performed slightly, but not significantly, better
(28.6%). Clearly, Flickr users do not form friendships based
on their country of origin and country attribute in Flickr
is not autocorrelated (only 23% of the links are between
users from the same country). Another possible explana-
tion is that the class had a very skewed distribution which
persisted in friendship circles. The blockmodeling attack,
BLOCK, performed worse, with only 8.8% accuracy, show-
ing that users from a particular country did not form a
natural block to explain their linking patterns. The only
successful link-based attack was the ”flattened” link model,
LINK. With simple binary features, it achieved an accuracy
of 56.5%. We performed experiments based on both inlinks
and outlinks, as well as ignoring the direction of the links.
The results were slightly better using undirected links, and
these are the results we report.
From a privacy perspective, the results from the link-
based models are actually positive, showing that in this
dataset, exposing the friendship links is not a serious threat
to privacy for the studied attribute. The only model which
performed well, LINK, shows that if an adversary tries to
predict private attributes of users using it, then he has al-
most a 50-50 chance of being wrong.
Group-based attacks. Next, we evaluate the attacks which
used groups. For the CLIQUE model, we converted the
groupmate relationships into friendship relationships. This
led to an extremely high densification of the network. From
an average of 142 friends per user, the average node de-
gree became 7, 239 (out of maximum possible 9, 178). Since
the CLIQUE model can use any of the link-based models,
we chose to use it with the LINK model because it per-
formed best from the link-based models. This CLIQUE-
LINK model has an accuracy of 46.3% and due to the lack
of sparsity, its training took much longer time than any of
the other approaches.
Figure 3: GROUP prediction accuracy on Flickr with 50% private profiles and relevant groups chosen based
on (a) varying size, (b) varying entropy, and (c) a varying minimum requirement for the number of public
profiles per group (maximum entropy cutoff at 0.5). Accuracy for various percent of public profiles in the
network (d): the less public profiles, the worse the accuracy and therefore, the better the privacy of users.
Figure 4: Assuming 50% public profiles, the
GROUP accuracy drops significantly if Flickr users
with private profiles do not join low-entropy groups.
The group-based classification results were more promis-
ing. We evaluated our methods under a wide range of con-
ditions, and we report on the ones that provided more in-
sight in terms of high accuracy and node coverage. Fig-
ure 3(a) shows that näıvely running GROUP on all group
memberships, the prediction accuracy was 63.5%. However,
as larger groups are excluded, the accuracy improves even
further (72.1%). This shows that medium to small-sized
groups are more informative. Choosing the relevant groups
based solely on their entropy shows even better results (Fig-
ure 3(b)). Using the groups with entropy lower than 0.5
resulted in the best accuracy. We also pruned groups based
on varying percentages of public profiles per group which
raised the accuracy even further (Figure 3(c)). Other ad-
vantages of choosing relevant groups were that it reduced
the group space by 71.2% and that SVM training time was
much shorter. The disadvantage is that as we prune groups,
some of the users do not belong to any of the chosen groups,
thus the node coverage decreases: 51% of the private profile
attributes were predicted with 83.6% accuracy.
For privacy purposes, this is a strong result, and it means
that groups can help an adversary predict the sensitive at-
tribute for half of the users with private profiles with a high
accuracy. Figure 3(d) shows that as the number of users
with private profiles in the network increases, the accuracy
gets worse. However, even in the case of mostly private
profiles, the GROUP attack is still successful (63.4%). The
reported results are for the case when the minimum por-
tion of public profiles per group is equal to the portion in
the overall network and the cutoff for the maximum group
entropy is at 0.5.
Looking at the most and least relevant groups also pro-
vides interesting insights. The most heterogeneous group
that our method found is ”worldwidewondering - a travel at-
las.” As its name suggests, it pertains to users from different
countries and using it to predict someone’s country seems
useless. Some of the larger homogeneous groups include
”Beautiful NC,” ”Disegni e scritte sui muri” and ”*Neder-
land belicht*”. Other homogeneous groups were related to
country but not in such an obvious manner. For example,
one of them has the nondescript name ”::PONX::” which
turned out to be the title of a Mexican magazine. For one
user we looked at, this group helped us determine that al-
though he claims to be from all over the world, he is most
likely from Mexico.
Insights on privacy preservation. Since including only low-
Figure 5: GROUP prediction accuracy on (a) Dogster and (b) BibSonomy.
entropy groups significantly boosts the success of the group-
based attack, we conjectured that not participating in low-
entropy groups helps people preserve their privacy better.
Figure 4 shows that if users with private profiles do not join
low-entropy groups, then GROUP is no longer successful.
5.3.2 Facebook
We performed the same experiments for Facebook as for
Flickr but we omit the figures due to space constraints. We
provide a summary of the results here.
Link-based attacks. In predicting gender, we found that
while AGG, CC and BLOCK performed similarly to the
baseline, LINK’s accuracy varied between 65.3% and 73.5%.
In predicting the political views, the link-based methods per-
formed similarly to the baseline as Table 2 shows. LINK’s
average accuracy was not significantly different from the
rest. We also performed binary classification to predict
whether someone is liberal or not and the results were sim-
ilar. The best-performing method was LINK with 61.8%
accuracy. From privacy perspective, this result means that
while it is easy to predict gender, it is hard to predict the
political views of Facebook users based on their friendships.
Group-based attacks. The GROUP attack was successful
in predicting gender (73.4%) when using all groups. Select-
ing groups that have at least 50% public profiles per group
raised the accuracy by 4% but dropped the node coverage
by a half. Predicting political views with GROUP was not
successful (45.2%); some possible explanations are that the
groups we considered are not real social groups and that
books, movies and music taste of first-year college students
may not be related to their political views. The relatively
low number of groups may also have had an effect.
5.3.3 Dogster
Link-based attacks. Due to the fact that this was a ran-
dom rather than a snowball sample, there were only 432
nodes with links, and link-based methods are at an unfair
disadvantage, so we do not report their results here.
Group-based attacks. In Dogster, the baseline accuracy
was 28.6%. CLIQUE-LINK’s accuracy was significantly higher
(60.2%), as was GROUP’s accuracy (65.5%) when there
were 50% public profiles. Pruning groups based on entropy
led to even higher accuracy (88.9%) but had lower node cov-
erage (14.9%). Figure 5(a) shows the accuracy and node cov-
erage for various private profile percentage assumptions. We
tried different options for the maximum group entropy re-
quired, and here, we report on the results for 0.5. The accu-
racy increased significantly as the number of public profiles
in the network increased with one exception: the accuracies
for 70% and 90% public profiles did not have a statistically
significant difference. A group named ”All Fur Fun” was the
least homogeneous of all groups, i.e., had the highest group
entropy of 2.7. The online profile of the group shows that
this is a group that invites all dogs to party together, so it
is not surprising that dogs of many different breeds join.
5.3.4 BibSonomy
Group-based attacks. We used the BibSonomy data to
see whether the group-based classification approach can also
help in predicting whether someone is a spammer or not.
There is a large class skew in the data: most of the labeled
user profiles are spammer profiles and the baseline accu-
racy in the absence of links and groups is 92.2%. Using all
groups when 50% of the profiles are public leads to a statis-
tically significant improvement in the accuracy (94%) and
has a very good node coverage (98.5%); this covers almost
all users with tags that at least one other user uses (98.7%).
The accuracy results for BibSonomy are presented in Fig-
ure 5(b). We explored different options for the minimum
entropy required, and we report on the results for it being
0, i.e., only completely homogeneous groups were chosen.
As in the other results, the coverage gets lower when the
most homogeneous groups are chosen (which in the spam
case is actually undesirable). Precision was 99.9-100% in
all group-based classification cases, meaning that virtually
all predicted spammers were such, whereas in the baseline
case, it is 92.2%. The results also suggest that if more pro-
files were labeled, then more covered spammers would be
caught. Some of the homogeneous tags with many taggers
include ”mortgage” and ”refinance.”
6. RELATED WORK
To position our work, here, we present a brief overview of
related work in privacy and learning in network data.
6.1 Privacy
According to Li et. al. [11], there are two types of privacy
attacks in data: identity disclosure and attribute disclosure,
and identity disclosure often leads to attribute disclosure.
Identity disclosure occurs when the adversary is able to de-
termine the mapping from a record to a specific real-world
entity (e.g. an individual). Attribute disclosure occurs when
an adversary is able to determine the value of a user at-
tribute that the user intended to stay private. We are inter-
ested in attribute disclosure in online social networks using
the public profiles, friendship links and group memberships.
The privacy literature recognizes two types of privacy
mechanisms: interactive and non-interactive [6]. In the in-
teractive mechanism, an adversary poses queries to a database
and the database provider gives noisy answers. In the non-
interactive setting, a data provider releases an anonymized
version of the database to meet privacy concerns. Even
though our work is closer to the non-interactive setting, the
goal of our data provider is not to anonymize a dataset but
to ensure that users’ private data remains private and can-
not be inferred using links, groups and public profiles.
Until recently, the literature on anonymization consid-
ered only single-table data, in which the rows represent i.i.d.
records, and the columns represent record attributes [1, 5,
11, 15, 21]. Real-world data is often relational, and records
may be related to one another or to records from other ta-
bles. Relational data poses new challenges to preserving the
privacy of individuals [3, 8, 14, 17, 18, 24]. For example, in
graph data, there is a third type of disclosure attack: link
re-identification [24]. Link re-identification is the problem of
inferring that two entities participate in a particular type of
sensitive relationship or communication. If one anonymizes
the data näıvely by removing personal attributes and re-
placing them with a random identifier, it still is possible to
identify individuals based on their subgraph structure [3, 8,
14]. It is also possible to link records in anonymized data
to external relational data sources to disclose attribute val-
ues [17]. Our work is complementary in that we assume
that the identities of people are known but the value of the
sensitive attribute of some of them is not directly available.
We propose several simple models for inferring the hidden
sensitive attributes using the observed attributes, link and
group information in a single data source. It is important
to be aware of the different possible privacy attacks in order
to guide anonymization techniques.
He et al. [9] provide an interesting study on the use of
friendship links in predicting private attributes in a Live-
Journal sample in which the friendship links are given. They
create synthetic attribute values in the sample, assuming au-
tocorrelation, and show how to use a Bayesian network in
predicting sensitive attributes. In contrast, we consider a
variety of attacks assuming a richer network structure and
we use social groups. We also test the attacks on four net-
works with real attributes, showing that autocorrelation is
not as ubiquitous as expected.
6.2 Learning in network data
In the last decade, there has been a growing interest in
supervised classification that relies not only on the object at-
tributes but also on the attributes of the objects it is linked
to, some of which may be unobserved [7]. Link-based classi-
fication in network data, such as social networks, breaks the
assumption that data comprises of i.i.d. instances and it can
take advantage of autocorrelation, the property that makes
the classes of linked objects correlated with each other. For
example, political affiliations of friends tend to be similar,
students tend to be friends with other students, etc. A com-
prehensive review of collective classification can be found in
the work by Sen et al. [20].
The goal of unsupervised learning or clustering is to group
objects together based on their similarity. In social net-
works, clusters can be found based on attribute and/or struc-
tural information. For example, Neville and Jensen [19] de-
scribe how autocorrelation in relational data is sometimes
caused by the presence of such hidden clusters or groups in
the data which influence the attributes of the group mem-
bers. They use a spectral clustering method based on node
links in the data to discover groups, and then use the groups
to classify the nodes. Their method assumes that groups
do not overlap. Airoldi et al. [2] study mixed-membership
clustering of relational data to predict protein function. It
is assumed that the cluster assignment is related to the node
attribute value in question.
In contrast to these approaches, we are interested in clas-
sifying nodes when group membership is explicitly given and
only a subset of the groups is related to the node attribute
in question. This is different from the case where groups
need to be detected because explicit groups can represent a
latent common interest that neither attribute nor structural
information contains. We propose a relational classification
method that makes use of groups with member-set overlaps,
and it distinguishes groups that are relevant to classification
based on group features such as size and homogeneity.
7. DISCUSSION
Privacy. Our work shows that groups can leak a signif-
icant amount of information and not joining homogeneous
groups preserves privacy better. People who are truly con-
cerned about their privacy should consider properties of the
groups they join, and social network providers should warn
their users of the privacy breaches associated with joining
groups. Of course, in dynamically-evolving environments, it
is harder to assess whether a group will remain diverse as
more people join and leave it. Another privacy aspect is the
ability to join public groups but display group memberships
only to friends. Currently, neither Facebook nor Flickr al-
low group memberships to be private and this is a desirable
solution to the problem we have discussed.
Surprisingly, link-based methods did not perform as well
as we expected. This suggests that breaking privacy in so-
cial networks with mixed private and public profiles is not
necessarily straightforward, and using friends in classifying
people has to be treated with care. We also conjecture that
this depends on the dataset. For example, while link-based
methods were not very successful in predicting the location
of users in Flickr, they may work well in LiveJournal; for
example, a study by Liben-Nowell et al. [12] showed that
most of the friendship links in LiveJournal are related to geo-
graphical proximity. Another important point to consider is
the nature of the sensitive attribute we are trying to predict.
For example, predicting someone’s political views may be a
very hard task in general. Recent research by Baldassarri et.
al. [4] shows that most Americans are neither consistently
liberal nor conservative, and thus labeling a person as one
or the other is inappropriate.
It is also important to consider that in some cases, the
assumption that unpublished private attributes can be pre-
dicted from those made public may not hold. This happens
when the attribute distribution in private profiles is very
different from the one in public profiles. An extreme exam-
ple is a disease attribute which shows values for common
diseases such as Flu, Fever, etc, in public profiles, whereas
more sensitive values such as HIV appear only in private
profiles. In a similar example, young people tend to make
their age public, and older ones tend to keep it secret. We
plan to address this issue in future work.
Data anonymization. Our results suggest that a data
provider should consider removing groups that are homo-
geneous in respect to sensitive attributes before releasing
an anonymized dataset in the public domain. All the pri-
vacy attacks we studied are also meant to show that more
sophisticated anonymization techniques are necessary. The
challenge of anonymizing graph data lies in understanding
the rich dependencies in the data and removing sensitive in-
formation which can be inferred by direct or indirect means.
Here, we show an attribute-disclosure attack in data which
is meant to be partially private. We look at the attribute
disclosure problem as a relational classification problem and
we show how to use friendship links, group affiliation and
public attribute values as its features to effectively infer pri-
vate attributes.
Data mining. We show that it is possible to predict the at-
tributes of some users with hidden profiles and create better
statistics of the attribute’s overall distribution. For exam-
ple, if a marketing company can predict the gender and lo-
cation of users with hidden profiles, it can make its targeted
marketing much better. As groups with higher entropy are
added, the uncertainty associated with the attribute pre-
diction gets higher, and it becomes harder to utilize the
existence of diverse groups for sensitive attribute inference.
Remaining research questions. There are a number of in-
teresting questions that remain to be answered: What are
the properties that make a social network vulnerable to a
group-based attack? Are profiles on social media websites
more or less vulnerable than ones on a purely networking
website? What are the specific privacy guidelines that a
social network website provider should follow to ensure its
users are protected against unintended privacy leaks? Do
users with private profiles have group-membership patterns
that are different and more privacy-preserving from public-
profile members?
8. CONCLUSION
While having a private profile is a good idea for the privacy-
concerned users, their links to other people and affiliations
with public groups pose a threat to their privacy. In this
work, we showed how one can exploit a social network with
mixed profiles to predict the sensitive attributes of users.
Using group information, we were able to discover the sen-
sitive attribute values of some users with surprisingly high
accuracy on four real-world social-media datasets. We hope
that these results will raise the privacy awareness of social
media users and will motivate social media websites to en-
able greater control over release of information and to help
their users understand the potential for leaking information.
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